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In this paper we analyze the trends in labor force participation and transitions to benefit programs
of older workers in relation to health trends as well as recent Social Security reforms. Our preliminary
conclusions are pessimistic regarding the effect of health improvements on the labor market attachment
of older workers since we show that despite the large improvements in the mortality rates among older
individuals in Spain, the employment rates of individuals older than fifty-five remain lower than the
ones observed in the late 1970s. Some caution should remain in our conclusions as the evidence on
health trends is inconclusive. Regarding the effect of Social Security reforms, we find that both the
1997 and the 2002 reform decreased the stock into old-age benefits at the cost of an increased share
of the participation into disability. Finally, we find that there was a significant increase in the outflow
from employment into disability after the 2002 reform.
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Disability has always been an important social welfare program in developed countries 
and Spain is not an exception. The program represents an average of 1.5 % of GDP in 
the 1995-2010 period, slightly below the EU average of 2.2 % of the GDP.   The relative 
importance of the program with respect to the pension program has varied in the last 20 
to 25 years. In 1977 the ratio of benefits originated from disabilities to retirement 
benefits was 0.44, in 1985, by the end of the early 80 crisis, it reached a maximum of 
0.58, and decreased slowly since then. By 1997 the ratio was again down to 0.45. Figures 
from 1998 are difficult to compare since all disability pensions from age 65+ are since 
then converted to retirement benefits but back of the envelope calculations
1 suggest that 
the ratio decreased in early 2000s and increased from 2008 because of the recent crisis.  
 
The above ratio of benefits has a clear business cycle component because the disability 
program has been often used to cushion recessions and to alleviate transitions into and 
from economic inactivity in regions of high unemployment, as suggested by Disney and 
Webb (1991), McVicar (2006), and more recently Benítez-Silva et al (2010). In addition, 
disability programmes have often been used as an alternative to early retirement through 
pension programmes, either because of restrictions on early retirement, or because 
disability programmes offer more attractive after-tax benefit levels (Gruber and Wise, 
1999, 2004; Jiménez-Martín et al. 2006, Jiménez-Martin and Vall-Castelló, 2009). This 
alternative ‘route’ into inactivity for older people proved particularly attractive when 
employers were seeking to shed older workers in periods of recession such as the early 
1980s, early 1990s and late 2000s.   
 
It is common in the literature to distinguish between ‘health disability’, which arises from 
clear diagnosed medical conditions, and ‘work disability’, which may also have its roots in 
economic and social circumstances. Although there is a link between work and health 
disability, economic conditions, and, the variations in the risk of unemployment over 
time, may play an important part in explaining the dynamics of the disability rolls 
(Benítez-Silva et al, 2010). Other factors, including the trend in the relative generosity of 
                                                 
1 Own calculations using data from the MCVL (“Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”), which 
constitutes a random sample of administrative records provided by the Spanish Social Security 
Administration.    3
disability benefits relative to unemployment or pension benefits (Autor and Duggan 
(2003, 2006) and Burkhauser and Daly (2001) in the United States, and OECD (2006, 
2007) more generally), and underlying demographic and morbidity trends, are also 
relevant.   
 
As in many other OECD countries, in Spain the underlying demographic trends are very 
favorable. The increase in life expectancy at birth has also been translated in increases in 
life expectancy at age 65. In 1960 women aged 65 expected to live 15.3 more years, while 
the expectations were 21.9 in 2008. Similar improvements are also observed among men 
(from 13.1 in 1960 to 18.0 in 2008) (OECD Health Data, 2010). As a consequence there 
have been striking improvements in age-specific mortality rates over the last 50 years in 
Spain across individuals aged over fifty-five. The extent to which these changes translate 
into higher labor capacity depends on the evolution of ill-health. Thus, further reduction 
in the age-specific mortality rate will only translate in an increase in the population able 
to work at older ages if the average age of the onset of a work-related disability increases 
and, simultaneously, the requirement to work for the disabled are adjusted accordingly. 
 
When analyzing trends of disability rolls it is also needed to take into account Social 
Security reforms as they may change the relative balance between the various exit routes 
into (retirement) benefits. There have been two main Social Security reforms since 1990. 
In 1997 the medical requirements of the disability system were tightened and the 
generosity of the old-age pension system was decreased, while in 2002 the job search 
criteria to receive unemployment benefits was tightened and more incentives to retire 
later were introduced. 
 
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the trends in labor force participation and 
transitions to benefit programs of older workers in relation to health trends. In particular, 
we explore questions such as: Do mortality improvements at older ages translate into 
more participation? Do we reach the same conclusions with other health variables? Do 
health improvements reduce the prevalence of disability among older workers? Have 
recent social security reforms favored the participation of older workers, and in 
particular, of disabled workers? Have these reforms affected transitions from 
employment to unemployment or disability at older ages? Do we find any substitution 
across programs?    4
 
Those questions referring to the link between program participation and health will be 
analyzed descriptively. Alternatively, those questions referring to the effect of reforms in 
program participation will be evaluated using stock and flow administrative data of 
participation into unemployment, disability and retirement for individuals approaching 
the normal retirement age complemented with data from the Spanish Labor Force 
Survey. In order to help identifying the key parameters of the model we use data 
aggregated at the gender and age-group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) level using two levels of 
regional aggregation.  
 
Our preliminary conclusions are pessimistic regarding the effect of health improvement 
on the labor market attachment of older workers since we show that despite the large 
improvements in mortality rates among older individuals in Spain, the employment rates 
of individuals older than fifty-five remain lower than the ones observed in the late 1970s. 
On the other hand, decreases in mortality rates do not necessarily go hand in hand with 
improvements in population health and we do not find any conclusive evidence on 
health improvements. Regarding the effect of Social Security reforms we find that both 
the 1997 and the 2002 reform decreased the stock into old-age benefits at the cost of an 
increased share of the participation into disability. More interestingly, the magnitude of 
the two opposite effects is the same suggesting a clear substitution effect among these 
two programs in the older age-groups. Finally, we find that none of these two reforms 
had any effect on the share of these age-groups into unemployment, which is highly 
explained by the total share of the population out of employment. Regarding the effects 
of these two reforms on the outflows from employment we find that there was a 
significant increase in the outflow from employment into disability after the 2002 reform. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the institutional setting 
and discuss disability insurance and pension reforms. In section 3 we review historical 
data on mortality, health status and use and labor force participation, and compare their 
trends during the last thirty years. We analyze the effect of program reforms on disability 
rolls and the substitution among the different programs in section 4. Last, section 5 
concludes.  
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2. DI and social security reforms 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide descriptive evidence on the relationship between past 
trends on health status and labor market participation at older ages and the role of Social 
Security reforms. Therefore, we first describe the disability system in Spain, as it is the 
pathway out of employment more closely linked to the individual’s health. However, the 
transition into a program will also depend on the availability and characteristics of the 
other programs. Therefore, we also highlight the main changes in the unemployment and 
old-age systems. In all three cases, the Social Security is responsible for the payment of 
contributory benefits (old-age, disability, unemployment, temporary sick-leave, maternity-
leave and survivor’s benefits), while non-contributory benefits are managed by the 
regional authorities of each Autonomous Community and the IMSERSO (the Institute 
of Aged People and Social Services) in Ceuta and Melilla.  
 
2.1 The Disability Insurance System 
In Spain, there are two types of permanent disability benefits: i) contributory, which are 
given to individuals who have generally contributed to the Social Security system before 
the onset of the disabling condition; ii) and non-contributory, which are given to 
individuals who are assessed to be disabled but have never contributed to the Social 
Security system (or do not reach the minimum contributory requirement to access the 
contributory system). Non-contributory disability benefits are means-tested
2 and 
managed at the regional level.  
 
The size of the non-contributory system is relatively small compared to the contributory 
system (197,126 individuals received non-contributory disability benefits in 2009, while 
920,860 received contributory benefits during the same year). The amount of benefits 
received is also smaller in the non-contributory case (the average non-contributory 
pension is 417.09 Euros/month compared to an average contributory disability pension 
of 831.49 Euros/month). However, the benefit level for non-contributory disability 
pensions differs quite a lot across regions, as the benefits are managed at the regional 
level. Figure 1 shows the average contributory and non-contributory disability pension by 
Autonomous Community. It can be seen that in all cases the average contributory 
                                                 
2 Income is evaluated yearly. The income threshold in 2010 was set at 4,755.80 Euros/year for an 
individual living alone. This amount is adjusted if the individual lives with other members.   6
pension exceeds the average non-contributory pension. In addition, while the average 
non-contributory disability pension amounts around 400 Euros/month in all the regions, 
the average contributory pension varies from 677 Euros/month in Extremadura up to 
1,070 Euros/month in País Vasco. In the remaining of this chapter we mainly focus on 
the permanent contributory disability system in Spain. 
 
Figure 1. Average contributory and non-contributory disability benefits across 


















































































































































































Source: own elaboration from data from the Ministry of Work and Immigration 
 
The Social Security defines the permanent contributive disability insurance as the 
economic benefits to compensate the individual for losing a certain amount of wage or 
professional earnings when affected by a permanent reduction or complete loss of 
his/her working ability due to the effects of a pathologic or a traumatic process derived 
from an illness or an accident.  
 
In order to capture the different situations in which a person can be after suffering from 
a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security administration uses a classification of 
four main degrees of disability that depend on the working capacity lost: 
   7
(i)  Permanent limited disability for the usual job: the individual losses at least 33% 
of the standard performance for his/her usual job but the individual is still able 
to develop the fundamental tasks of his/her usual job or professional activity. 
Individuals in this level of disability only receive a one-time lump sum payment. 
(ii)  Partial disability: the individual is impaired to develop all or the fundamental 
tasks of his/her usual job or professional activity, but he/she is still capable of 
developing a different job or professional activity. 
(iii)  Total disability: the individual is impaired for the development of any kind of job 
or professional activity. 
(iv)  Severe Disability: Individuals who, as a result of anatomic or functional loses, 
need the assistance of a third person to develop essential activities of daily living 
such as eating, moving, etc… 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of individuals receiving disability benefits, by region and 
degree of disability in 2009 
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Source: own elaboration using data on disability pensions from the Ministry of Work and Immigration 
(www.mtin.es) and population from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (www.ine.es). 




Figure 2 shows the distribution of individuals receiving disability benefits by degree of 
disability and region in 2009. It can be seen that in all the Spanish regions, the percentage   8
of individuals receiving permanent limited disability was rather small. In fact, at a 
national level, only 917 out of the 920,863 contributory permanent disability pensions 
were for individuals classified as permanent limited disabled for the usual job in 2009. 
The second dimension shown in Figure 2 is the regional variation not only in the 
percentage of the working-age population receiving disability benefits but also on its 
distribution across types. Asturias is the region with a higher share of the working-age 
population receiving contributory disability benefits (4.9%) followed by Galicia (3.8%), 
Andalucía (3.7%) and Cantabria (3.6%). On the other end, Madrid is the region with the 
lowest percentage of recipients of contributory disability benefits (1.6%). 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of the population aged 16-64 that is receiving non-
contributory benefits. As argued before, the share of the population receiving non-
contributory benefits is smaller when we exclude the special autonomous regions of 
Ceuta and Melilla. Among the others, we find the highest percentages in Canarias, Galicia 
and Extremadura.   
 
Figure 3. Percentage of the population aged 16-64 receiving non-contributory 























































































































































































































Source: own elaboration using data on disability pensions from the Ministry of Work and Immigration 
(www.mtin.es) and population from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (www.ine.es). Note: the percentages 
have been computed as total number of disability beneficiaries / population aged 16-64 
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2.1.1  Eligibility and Pension Amount 
 
The eligibility requirements and the pension amount depend on the source of the 
disability (ordinary illness, work related or unrelated accident or occupational illness), the 
level of the disability and the age of the onset of the disability. Table 1 summarizes the 
main parameters of both the eligibility criteria and the pension formula. The two main 
features to highlight are: i) there are not contributory requirements if the health 
impairment is due to either an accident or a occupational illness; ii) individuals older than 
fifty-five with a partial disability receive a higher replacement rate if it is considered 
difficult for them to find a job due to lack of education or the social and labor market 
conditions of the region where they live.   
 
The total amount of the pension is obtained multiplying a percentage, which varies 
depending on the type of pension and degree of disability as shown in the last rows of 
Table 1, to the regulatory base, which depends on the source of the disability and on 
previous salaries
3. The number of years included in the regulatory base depends on the 
source of disability.  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of the parameters to calculate permanent disability pensions 
 







Age >= 31: 
Contributed 1/4 time 
between 20 years old 
and disabling 
condition. Minimum of 






Age < 30:  
Contributed 1/3 time 
between 16 years old 
and disabling 
condition. No 




Average wage last 8 
years of work 
Average annual 
wage of 24 
months within 
the last 7 years of 
Average wage 
last year of work 
                                                 
3 Benefit=Regulatory Base * Percentage   10
work
Percentage 
applied to the 
regulatory base 
Partial Disability: 55% 
Individuals older than 55 with difficulties to find a job due to 
lack of education or characteristics of the social and labor 
market of the region where they live: 75%
Total Disability: 100% 
Severe Disability: 100%+50% 
 
 
The income tax rules differ across type of disability. Partial disability benefits are taxable 
under the general income tax rules, while total disability pensions are always exempted 
from income taxes. Furthermore, if the individual works while receiving the pension, 
there is a reduction in the earnings used to calculate the income tax of 2,800 Euros/year 
if their degree of disability is low (between 33% and 65%) or 6,200 if the disability level is 
higher (more than 65%) or if the disabled has reduced mobility. In addition, individuals 
receiving partial disability benefits can combine the benefits with earnings from work, as 
long as the type of job is compatible with his/her disability.  
 
In general, to be granted a permanent disability benefit, the individual must come from 
sick leave (also called temporary disability/incapacity), and after following the prescribed 
medical treatment, he/she still presents in principle anatomic or functional reductions 
that decrease or cancel his/her capacity to work. The application can be started by the 
provincial office of the National Institute of Social Security (NISS), by the institutions 
that collaborate in the process (such as hospitals), or by the individual himself (in which 
case, more documentation is required). The Disabilities Evaluation Team evaluates the 
medical report and the professional background of the solicitant, and on the basis of this 
analysis, the directors of the provincial office of the NISS decide on the type of disability 
pension granted (if any), the benefit level and the date of the next medical check-up. All 




2.1.2  Sick leave or temporary disability 
Sick leave benefits are available to all workers who have contributed for at least 180 days 
during the five years prior to the onset of the illness in the case of common illness. If the 
                                                 
4 Most of the outflows from the permanent disability system are due to death or automatic transfer to old-
age pensions. Around 4% of the outflows are due to improvement of the health condition and 2.7% to a 
judicial process. Monthly outflows in 2010 were around 2,500-3,000.   11
origin of the sick leave is an accident (whether or not working accident) or an 
occupational illness, no minimum contributory period is required.  
 
The amount of benefits also depends on the source of the disability. Individuals who 
have a disability because of a working accident or an occupational illness are entitled to 
75% of the basic salary (including overtime pay) from the first day of leave. In the other 
cases, there is a waiting period of three days without benefits unless it is covered by a 
collective agreement, and from the fourth day until the twentieth the employee receives 
sixty percent of the basic salary. After the twenty-first day, the compensation represents 
seventy-five percent of the basic salary. The social security pays from the first day if a 
working accident or occupational illness, and from day sixteen otherwise. The employer 
pays in this case from the fourth until the fifteenth day. It is not possible to combine 
sickness benefits with any kind of paid work, even part-time work. 
 
The duration of the benefits is for a maximum of 12 months with a potential extension 
of an additional six months when it is foreseeable that the beneficiary will become 
capable of working within this additional period of time. At the end of this period the 
individual is either considered non-disabled or can apply to permanent disability benefits. 
Certification and monitoring of the sick leave is ensured by a doctor (GP) of the Public 
Health Services (or from a doctor from a Mutual Work Fund). 
 
2.1.3  Major health conditions of disability benefits recipients 
 
Figure 4 shows the percentage distribution of total contributory and non-contributory 
disability recipients by health conditions, distinguishing among mental, muscular-skeletal 
and other health problems by three age-groups in 2004. First of all, it is important to 
note the importance of the musculoskeletal conditions as 50.3% of all the individuals 
receiving a disability benefit in Spain are on the basis of a musculoskeletal health 
problem. This condition is more prevalent among the youngest group, as it represents 
59.4% among the individuals aged 20-34 receiving disability benefits. Its importance 
slightly decreases with age (54.0% of disability pensioners aged 35-49 and 48.2% of 
disability pensioners aged 50-64).  
   12
The figure also shows that 9.7% of all the individuals in the disability rolls are diagnosed 
with a mental condition, being the prevalence higher among the younger. The share of 
claimants due to mental health conditions is among the smallest in Europe. For example, 
the share of inflows into disability due to mental diseases was 34.3 % in UK in 2006, 
41% in Switzerland in 2004, 43.4% in Denmark in 2005 or 25.4% in Norway in 2004 
(OECD, 2008).  
 
Figure 4. Major health conditions of disability benefit recipients in Spain, 2004. 
Percentage distribution of total benefit recipients by age group.  












20-34 35-49 50-64 Total
Mental Muscular-skeletal Other
       
Source: Data from OECD, 2007. Data refer only to a sample of people with legal disability. This data 
comes from special tabulations provided by the University of Madrid, based on linked NISS and 
IMSERSO data.  
 
 
The share of “other health conditions” varies across age-groups, as it represents from 
26.9% of the pensioners aged 20-34 up to 43.3% of the pensioners aged 50-64. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence available of the distribution of the other illnesses. In 
order to shed some light on its likely distribution, Figure 5 shows both the percentage of 
total cases and total days of sickness leave (temporary disability) in Spain in 2005. The 
biggest category within the specific illnesses is “Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 
and connective tissue”, which corresponds to the main category among the recipients of 
disability benefits. Next, diseases of the respiratory system have the second highest share 
among the number of cases, while mental health problems have the second highest share 
in the number of days. Surprisingly, the share associated with circulatory problems both 
in days and cases is smaller, and similar to the share of diseases of the digestive and the 
nervous systems. 
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Figure 5. Distribution by health problems of temporary disability or sickness 
leave in Spain in 2004 
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Source: own elaboration using data from Oliva (2010) 
 
2.1.4 Reforms of the Disability Insurance System 
Permanent disability benefits were used extensively as an early retirement mechanism for 
workers in restructuring industries (such as shipbuilding, steel, mining, etc…) or as 
substitution for long-term unemployment subsidies in depressed regions during the late 
1970 and 1980 (OECD, 2001), which resulted in an increase in the inflows into the 
disability system and permanent disability benefits.  
 
These events prompted a number of reforms introduced during the second half of 1980 
and beginning of 1990 in order to try to reverse these trends. The main aim of these 
reforms was to abolish the incentive effects to permanently leave the labor market before 
reaching the legal retirement age through the disability system.  
 
Here we focus on some distinctive features of the main reforms since the creation of the 
National Institute of Social Security in 1979, while refer the reader to Table 2 for a 
summary of all the reforms in the disability system in Spain during this period.    
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Table 2. Main reforms of the disability system in Spain 
1985  The terms of eligibility for disability pensions are tightened. 
1990  Introduction of a means-tested non-contributory disability pensions for 
people aged 65+ and for disabled people aged 18+ who satisfy residency 
requirements. 
1997  Stricter control of sickness status, reduction of long-term sickness benefit 
level, usual occupation replaces own job assessment. 
Permanent disability pensions individuals 65+ are converted to old-age 
pensions. 
New INSS disability assessment team to assess permanent disability instead of 
the GP. 
Entitlement to non-contributory benefits is not lost if working, and can be 
collected if losing the job.  
1998  Possibility for doctors from INSS and mutual insurance companies to review 
health situation of beneficiaries.
2004-
2005 
Improve monitoring and control of sickness leave with new INSS tool.  
Possibility to combine non-contributory disability with some earnings. 
2007  Minimum contributory period to access permanent disability is reduced for 
young workers. 
The formula to calculate the regulatory base of the benefit gets closer to the 
formula for old-age pensions. 
 
The first biggest reform of the disability system took place in 1997 and it included 4 main 
points: 
1)  Sickness benefits: stricter control of the sickness status by doctors of the 
Social Security system, reduction of the level of long-term sickness benefits, 
replacement of the old own job assessment by a more objective definition of 
the usual occupation of the individual. 
2)  Permanent disability pensions of individuals aged at least sixty-five are 
automatically transferred to the old-age pension system. This is just a change 
in the classification within the pensions system. 
3)  There is also a major organizational reform as all the permanent disability 
matters are transferred to the NISS. Until that moment, the permanent 
disability status was assessed and granted by the local GP’s and this reform 
created a group of experts (the disability assessment team; a newly created 
body inside the NISS) which was in charge of assessing the person’s ability 
to work on the basis of the available medical files and a special medical 
assessment done by one of the NISS doctors. 
   15
4)  The individual does not lose entitlement to non-contributory disability 
benefits if he/she starts working. He/she will then still be entitled to receive 
non-contributory disability benefits if he/she looses his/her job. 
Apart from this major reform in 1997, the 1998 budget law introduced the possibility for 
doctors from the NISS and mutual insurance companies to review the health situation 
and status of beneficiaries. However, in reality very few individuals in the permanent 
disability system do effectively lose their benefits.  
 
In 2004 and 2005 monitoring of the use of sickness leave was tightened with the creation 
of a new sub-department at the NISS and a new monitoring tool with the sole purpose 
of better monitoring and reducing absence rates. In 2005, a general absence control was 
put in place when the duration of absence was greater than six months.  
 
Finally, in 2007 the minimum contributory period to access permanent disability 
pensions was reduced for young workers in order to adjust for the current later entrance 
into the job market of younger workers. At the same time, the formula to calculate the 
regulatory base of the benefit was slightly modified: the regulatory base of permanent 
disability because of a common illness is decreased by 50% if the individual had not 
contributed at least 15 years and it is lower the further the individual is from age 65.    
 
All these reforms have ensured the financial stability of the disability system in Spain as 
inflow rates have remained at stable levels and have not experienced any dramatic 
increases like in other countries covered in this volume.  
 
2.2 Reforms in other Social Security Programs in Spain 
 
The extent to which reforms in the disability system are able to decrease the outflows 
from employment at older ages will depend on the evolution of other programs that can 
be used as alternative early retirement routes. Therefore, in this section we summarize 
other important reforms that have taken place in other Social Security Programs in Spain. 
In particular, we focus on reforms in the unemployment and old-age systems. Table 3 
provides a chronological summary of these reforms
5.  
                                                 
5 A detailed exposition of the changes in the old-age pension system in Spain is provided in Boldrin et al 
(2010)   16
 
In 1984, both temporary contracts and non-contributory unemployment benefits (also 
called unemployment assistance benefits) were introduced. In addition, a special 
provision was established for workers aged over fifty-five who were allowed to receive 
unemployment assistance benefits until retirement age. To receive these benefits, 
individuals had to satisfy the entitlement requirements of the retirement pension except 
for the age. The subsidy paid 75% of the minimum wage until reaching the age to be 
transferred to an old-age pension. Furthermore, the years spent unemployed under this 
special scheme were counted as contributive years towards an old-age pension. 
 
In the following year, 1985, an old-age pension reform was passed which increased the 
minimum mandatory annual contribution to old-age pensions from 8 to 15 years, it also 
increased the number of years of contribution used to calculate the pension from 2 to 8 
years
6 and introduced several early retirement programs linked to hiring a new worker, 
such as the Partial Retirement program that allowed part-time retirement at sixty-three 
combining part-time wages and old-age pension, and Special Retirement at sixty-four if 
the employer hired a registered unemployed. 
 
In 1989 the special provision of unemployment assistance benefits until the retirement 
age of sixty-five for individuals aged at least fifty-five was extended to individuals aged 
fifty-two, thus increasing the incentives of older workers to leave the labor market at 
younger ages. The expected decrease in the labor force participation rates of older 
individuals observed in Spain during the 1980s and the early 1990s prompted the 
government to adopt a change in the strategy, and to start a series of reforms to reverse 
these negative labor market trends. Therefore, the reforms introduced during the 1990s 
had the objective of keeping older workers active in the labor market for longer. 
 
There have been two main reforms since the mid 1990, in 1997 and 2002. In 1997 the 
number of contributory years used to compute the benefit bases was progressively 
                                                 
6 The change in the minimum mandatory annual contributions to have access to an old-age pension 
affected all individuals since 1985, but the number of years used to calculate the pension was progressively 
increased: during the first year, the last 70 months were used, 72 months in the second year and 84 in the 
third year.   
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increased from 8 to 15 years
7 and the formula to calculate the replacement rate was also 
made less generous. On the other hand, the 8% penalty applied to early retirees between 
the ages of 60 and 65 was reduced to 7% for individuals with 40 (or more) years of 
contributions at the time of early retirement. Some changes in the incentives on the 
demand side were also introduced in 1997 to reduce the unemployment rates and the 
share of temporary contracts among the most disadvantaged groups, among them the 
individuals aged forty-five or older who were either unemployed or had a temporary 
contract.  
 
In 2002 changes in both the old-age and the unemployment systems were introduced. 
Before 2002, only individuals who had contributed to the system earlier than 1967 could 
benefit from early retirement at sixty, while the rest had to wait until the normal 
retirement age at sixty-five. In 2002, earlier retirement at age sixty-one was made available 
for the rest of the population. At the same time, there was an impulse to the partial and 
flexible retirement schemes with the possibility of combining income from work with 
old-age benefits and the introduction of incentives for individuals to retire after the legal 
retirement age of 65. These consist on an additional 2% higher percentage per additional 
year of contribution beyond the age of 65 applied on top of the 100% applied to the 
regulatory base. In order to have access to this additional 2%, the worker needs to have a 
minimum contribution period of 35 years. 
 
At the same time, the possibility to access retirement is extended to individuals who are 
unemployed for reasons beyond their willingness at the age of 61 and who have 
contributed for at least 30 years and have been registered in the employment office for 
the last 6 months. 
 
On the other hand, the reform in 2002 opened up the possibility for individuals aged 
fifty-two or more who are receiving unemployment benefits to combine the receipt of 
these benefits with earnings, as they will receive 50% of normal benefits and the 
employer will pay the remaining quantity in wages. In addition, it extends the program 
that helps to integrate unemployed persons in the labor market
8 to all individuals aged at 
                                                 
7 In 1997 the last 108 months are included, the last 120 months in 1998, the last 132 months in 1999, the 
last 144 months in 2000, the last 156 months in 2001, the last 180 months from 2002 onwards.  
8 This program is called Contrato de Integración (Integration Contract).   18
least forty-five who have been unemployed for one month and to people with 
disabilities, among others.  
 
Last, in 2007 the incentives to retire later than age sixty-five were further increased 
providing an additional three percent, instead of the two percent agreed in 2002. 
Moreover, in order to have access to an old-age pension the individual must have 
contributed for at least two out of the last 15 years and the proportional part related to 
the extra monthly salaries will not be taken into account when computing the number of 
contributed years. On the other hand, the 8% penalty applied to early retirees between 
the ages of 60 and 65 was reduced to  between 6-7.5%, depending on the number of 
years contributed, for those individuals with 30 years of contributions. In addition, the 
contributions for unemployed workers older than fifty-two were increased so that they 
would receive a higher old-age pension when retiring,  
 
 
Table 3. Main reforms since 1980 of the old-age and unemployment systems in 
Spain 
1984  Introduction of temporary contracts. 
Introduction of unemployment assistance (UA) benefits (non-contributory). 
Special provision for workers aged 55+; can receive UA until retirement if 
comply with requirements to get old-age pension (except age requirement). 
1985  Increased the minimum mandatory annual contributions from 8 to 15. 
The number of contributive years used to compute the pension increases 
from 2 to 8. 
Several early retirement schemes are introduced; Partial retirement and special 
retirement at age 64.
1989  Special scheme of UA (permanent until retirement) extended to workers 52+.
1997  The number of contributive years used to compute the pension increases 
from 8 to 15 (progressively by 2001). 
The formula for the replacement rate is made less generous. 
The 8% penalty applied to early retirees between the ages of 60 and 65 is 
reduced to 7% for individuals with 40 or more contributory years. 
Introduction of a new permanent contract with reduced severance payments 
targeted to certain population groups. 
Lower social security contributions for employer’s for the first two years if 
one of these new permanent contracts was signed.
2001  Broaden the 1997 labor market reform;  
Extension of new permanent contract of 1997 to more population groups. 
Suppression or reduction of social security contributions to support 
permanent employment for certain groups of the population.  
2002  Early retirement only from age 61. 
Impulse partial retirement; possible to combine it with work. 
Unemployed aged 61 can retire if contributed for 30 years and 6 last months 
registered in employment offices.   19
Incentives to retire after age 65.
Individuals aged 52+ can combine unemployment benefits and a job. 
Extension of group of individuals that can benefit from the “integration 
contract” (program to help integrate unemployed into the labor market). 
2007  15 “effective” contributory years are used to calculate the pension. 
Reduction from 8% to 7.5% of the per-year penalty applied to early retirees 
between 60 and 65 for individuals with 30 contributory years. 
Broaden incentives to stay employed after age 65. 
Increase contributions made by the social security administration for 
individuals receiving the special scheme of UA for 52+ (they will receive a 
higher old-age pension when retiring). 
 
 
3. Historical data 
 
Mandatory insurance for job related accidents was introduced in Spain in 1900, through a 
bill that also authorized the creation of some funds, for public employees only, paying 
disability and retirement pensions. In 1919, mandatory retirement insurance (Retiro Obrero 
Obligatorio) was introduced for private-sector employees aged sixteen to sixty-five whose 
total annual salary was below a certain threshold. In 1926, a universal pension system for 
public employees (Régimen de Clases Pasivas) was established, which still exists under the 
same name. By the late 1930s, most Spanish employees were covered by some minimal 
government mandatory retirement insurance program.  
 
Since the introduction of the first insurance programs the life expectancy of the Spanish 
population has experienced an outstanding improvement; while the life expectancy at 
birth in 1930 was of 51.13 years for females and 47.46 for males, it achieved the 71.65 
(females) and 66.66 (males) years in 1960, and up to 84.07 (females) and 77.58 (males) 
years in 2006 (Human Mortality Database, 2010). The labor force participation of older 
workers has not always gone hand in hand with the evolution of life expectancy. In this 
section we provide some descriptive evidence of the trends in mortality, health and labor 
force participation in order to unravel the existence of any common trends during the 
last 30 years.    
 
3.1. Mortality  
  
The increase in life expectancy at birth has also been translated in increases in life 
expectancy at age 65. In 1960 women aged 65 expected to live 15.3 more years, while the 
expectations were 21.9 in 2008. Similar improvements are also observed among men   20
(from 13.1 in 1960 to 18.0 in 2008) (OECD Health Data, 2010). Moreover, the higher 
decrements in mortality rates achieved since 1960 are concentrated among the 
population aged 65 and older as Figure 6 shows. Figures 7 (men) and 8 (women) show 
how much steeper the decrease in mortality was among individuals aged 65 compared to 
individuals aged 60 or 55.  
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Mortality rates in Spain
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Human Mortality Database 
 
Figure 6 also shows that the decrease in mortality rates observed from 1960 to 1985 is 
similar to the decrease from 1985 to 2006. In addition, it shows that male’s mortality 
rates evolve after female’s mortality rates, as the curve for men in 1985 overlaps the 
female’s curve in 1960, and mortality rates of men in 2006 are similar to mortality rates of 
women in 1985. Therefore, one would expect further improvements in life expectancy 
and mortality rates, at least for men, in the coming years. 
 
One of the conclusions to be derived from Figures 7 and 8 is that individuals in later 
years reach the same mortality rates at older ages compared to previous cohorts. For 
example, women aged fifty-five in 1960 had the same mortality risk as women aged sixty 
in 1980 and women aged sixty-five in 2005 (0.006). If one understands by old age the 
later part of life with some reference to deterioration, then one would probably agree that 
the experience of a given high mortality rate should be part of the elements to be 
considered when classifying a group of individuals as elderly. As recently pointed out by   21
Shoven (2010)
9, this raises some challenges to compare individuals through time. For 
example, if individuals were classified as elderly in the 1960s at age sixty-five, it seems 
somehow surprising that they were still classified as elderly in 2000 when their mortality 
rates were like the ones of individuals aged sixty in 1960 among men, and even lower 
among women. This suggests that age-since-birth is possibly not the best measure to 
compare the ageing of populations across time, and it poses some questions about its 
convenience to set the rules of the social security system.    
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Mortality for men, by age
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Human Mortality Database 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show how individuals of different ages-since-birth could be considered 
to have the same age if measured by the same mortality rate. It plots the ages at which 
cohorts in different years face the mortality risk as sixty and sixty-five year olds in 1960. 
It can be seen that a men aged 72.7 (68.6) in 2006 had the same mortality risk as a 65 (60) 
year-old in 1960. Similarly, a women aged 74.8 (71.5) had the same mortality risk as a 65 
(60) year-old in 1960. Then, a mortality-based age system would suggest that a 74.8 year-
old woman in 2006 and a 65 year old woman in 1960 were the same age. Similarly, a 72.7 




                                                 
9 As Shoven (2010) acknowledges, similar ideas were proposed earlier by others. See for example Fuchs 
(1984) or Cutler and Sheiner (2001)   22
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Mortality for women, by age
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Human Mortality Database 
 
 
Figure 9.  Ages of equal mortality rate in Spain in 1960. Men 
 


















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Male age 60 Male age 65
Men
Age at which 1960 mortality rate is reached in Spain
72.7 
68.6   23
Figure 10. Ages of equal mortality rate in Spain in 1960. Women 
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Human Mortality Database 
 
 
3.2. Health trends 
 
We have previously shown that there has been striking improvements in age-specific 
mortality rates over the last 50 years in Spain across individuals aged over fifty-five. The 
extent to which these changes translate into higher labor capacity depends on the 
evolution of ill-health. Thus, further reduction in the age-specific mortality rates will only 
translate in an increase in the population able to work at older ages if the average age of 
the onset of a work-related disability increases. This would certainly be the case if the 
compression of morbidity hypothesis
10 (Fries, 1980) was satisfied. However, the 
international literature is inconclusive in this respect (Mackenbach et al. 2008). For 
example, the evidence provided by several studies that analyze disability trends in the US 
from the 1980s and 1990s suggests that while the prevalence rates for individuals older 
than sixty have decreased, the rates for the younger age groups have seen no 
improvement or even a deterioration (for example Crimmins et al 1999; Lakdawalla et al. 
2004; Bhattacharya et al. 2008) 
 
                                                 
10 Fries (1980) compression of morbidity states that the burden of lifetime illnesses will be concentrated in 












1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Female age 60 Female age 65
Women
Age at which 1960 mortality rate is reached in Spain
71.5 
74.8   24
In order to shed some light on the past-trends of health status in Spain we use data from 
the 1987, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003 and 2006 editions of the Spanish Health Survey 
(ENS) available from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy (www.msps.es). These are 
nationwide cross-sectional surveys that collect information on health and socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals. The surveys contain separate samples for adults (16+) and 
children. The figures presented below are based on the adult samples. We use weighting 
factors to compute the different averages.  
 











1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
At least Good 40-44 At least Fair 40-44
At least Good 50-54 At least Fair 50-54
At least Good 60-64 At least Fair 60-64
Self-assessed health. Men
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
Figures 11 and 12 show the evolution of self-assessed health status for men (Figure 11) 
and women (Figure 12) in the age-groups forty to forty-four, fifty to fifty-four and sixty 
to sixty-four based on the question “how would you rate your health during the last 
twelve months?”. We show the percentage of each age and gender group that report 
being in good or very good health (good at least) and the percentage that report being in 
fair, good or very good health (fair at least). The figures do not show an overall 
improvement in self-reported health, neither a worsening, although the percentage of 
women in at least good health has experienced a slight increase among the three age 
groups considered during the last twenty years. This improvement in self-assessed health 
among women is not found when looking at the percentage of women in at least fair 
health. In addition, older individuals are on average in worse health if percentages in at 
least good health are compared, but the differences disappear if averages on at least fair 
health are compared. This could suggest that reporting heterogeneity among age-groups   25
is stronger for reporting being in fair health, as one would expect a clear age-gradient in 
health status. 
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At least Good 40-44 At least Fair 40-44
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Self-assessed health. Women
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
 
















1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Work limitation 40-44 Accident 40-44
Work limitation 50-54 Accident 50-54
Work limitation 60-64 Accident 60-64
Health limitations. Men
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
In order to hypothesize what could have happened with the percentage of individuals 
with a health impairment to work, information which is not available for Spain, figures   26
13 (men) and 14 (women) depict the percentage of individuals with a work limitation
11 in 
the two weeks prior to the survey and the percentage of individuals who had any type of 
accident during the last year. First, they show that the percentage of individuals with a 
work limitation or who have experienced an accident has increased for all age-groups for 
both sexes during the last twenty years. On the other hand, while there is a clear age 
pattern among women, i.e., higher prevalence of both work limitations and accidents, the 
evidence among men is more mixed. 
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Year
Work limitation 40-44 Accident 40-44
Work limitation 50-54 Accident 50-54
Work limiation 60-64 Accident 60-64
Health limitations. Women
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
Figures 15 to 20 show trends in the prevalence of several diagnosed chronic illnesses: 
cholesterol, high blood pressure, diabetes, heart problems and asthma or bronchitis 
(respiratory problems). The data show that the prevalence of cholesterol and high blood 
pressure have increased both for men and women across all age groups. Moreover, the 
reported prevalence of men and women in their forties at the end of the time period is 
similar to the one reported by individuals aged fifty twenty years ago. On the other hand, 
one should be cautious before concluding from these increasing trends that the 
prevalence of these two health problems has increased over the observed period as this 
could be due to a better awareness of the population, which would translate in higher 
self-reported rates. Johnston et al (2009) find that, while the rates of self-reported 
hypertension in England were 5.5% in 1998 and 8.5% in 2003, hypertension measured by 
                                                 
11 It is based on the question: “Have you had to reduce your principal activity (work, study, house work) at 
least half a day due to a health discomfort or symptom in the last two weeks?”   27
a nurse on the same sample decreased from 37% to 31% over the same period. 
Unfortunately, this objective information is not available for Spain through time.   
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Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
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Year
Cholesterol High blood pressure Diabetes
Heart problems Respiratory
Prevalence of chronic illnesses. Women 40-44
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
On the other hand, the reported prevalence of diabetes, heart and respiratory problems 
remained stable through time with few exceptions: the prevalence of diabetes has 
increased among men older than fifty; the prevalence of bronchitis or asthma have   28
increased among the youngest and the oldest group of women; women in their sixties 
now suffer more heart problems.  
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Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
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Heart problems Respiratory
Prevalence of chronic illnesses. Men 60-64
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
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Cholesterol High blood pressure Diabetes
Heart problems Respiratory
Prevalence of chronic illnesses. Women 60-64
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
Figures 21 (men) and 22 (women) show the prevalence of overweight and/or obesity  in 
the last twenty years, which are known to be risk factors that could increase the burden 
of disease in the future. The data show that both the percentage of men with overweight 
and obesity have increased during the last twenty years among all age-groups, being the 
increase in obesity rates steeper than the increase in overweight rates. In 2006 almost 
eighty percent of men older than fifty are either overweight or obese compared to sixty 
percent in 1987.  
   30












1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Overweight 40-44 Overweight or obese 40-44
Overweight 50-54 Overweight or obese 50-54
Overweight 60-64 Overweight or obese 60-64
Overweight and obesity. Men
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
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Overweight 50-54 Overweight or obese 50-54
Overweight 60-64 Overweight or obese 60-64
Overweight and obesity. Women
 
Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Health Surveys 
 
The percentage of women who are overweight is lower compared to men, which is 
consistent with the evidence found by Andreyeva et al (2007) using data from the 2004 
sample of the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe. On the other hand, little have 
changed in the weight distribution of women aged forty to fifty-five. At the same time, 
the prevalence of reported obesity among women in their sixties has increased by ten 
percent in the last twenty years, while the percentage that report being overweight has 
remained around forty-five percent 
   31
In order to complement the self-reported descriptive evidence, we provide some 
information on the number of hospitalizations by type of diseases using administrative 
data from 1998 to 2007 from the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social Policy. We 
present data for the same three age groups, but unfortunately we are not able to show 
figures for men and women separately.    
 
Figures 23 to 25 show the number of hospitalizations for each 10,000 inhabitants by age 
group and by major condition. The data show that neoplasm and circulatory diseases are 
the two main groups of health conditions leading into a hospitalization among all age 
groups. Neoplasm represents the first cause among individuals younger than fifty in the 
overall period but its incidence has decreased since 2000. On the other hand, while 
circulatory problems were the main cause of hospitalization among individuals aged fifty 
to fifty-four ten years ago, currently it ranks second after neoplasm due to a decrease in 
the number of hospitalizations due to circulatory problems during the last decade. There 
is a decreasing trend in the number of hospitalizations due to health problems related to 
the circulatory system among the older age group, which remains the first cause, but 
simultaneously there is an increase in the number of hospitalizations due to a neoplasm.   
 
Figure 23. Number of hospitalizations for each 10,000 inhabitants by major 
conditions. Individuals aged 40-44 
 
Source: own elaboration from administrative data from the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social Policy 
 
It is also worth mentioning the observed increase in the number of hospitalizations due 
to mental problems, being it steeper among the youngest age group. The number of 
hospitalizations related to respiratory health problems has also increased among the   32
younger group, while a decreasing trend is found for the rest of the health problems 
considered. 
 
Figure 24. Number of hospitalizations for each 10,000 inhabitants by major 
conditions. Individuals aged 50-54 
 
Source: own elaboration from administrative data from the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social Policy 
 
Figure 25. Number of hospitalizations for each 10,000 inhabitants by major 
conditions. Individuals aged 60-64 
 
Source: own elaboration from administrative data from the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social Policy 
 
 
3.3 Mortality and health  
 
In the previous two sections we have shown that, while age-specific mortality rates have 
decreased through time, the evidence on the health status of the individuals aged forty to   33
sixty-five is less conclusive, and it depends on the health measure used. Here we explore 
further the relationship of Mortality with the other health variables.  
 
Figure 26 (men) and Figure 27 (women) compare Mortality Equivalent Ages versus SAH 
Equivalent Ages. We plot the average for each age-interval at the mid point of the 
intervals and then we fit a linear functional form for SAH and a power function for 
mortality. First, based on these rough estimates, Figure 26 shows that men aged 58.7 in 
2006 had the same mortality rates as men aged 55 in 1987, a difference of almost 4 years. 
The difference is about one year higher for women (Figure xx) as women aged 59.9 in 
2006 had the same mortality rates as women aged 55 in 1987. Second, both figures also 
show the proportion of individuals who reported that their health status was less than 
good in 1987 and 2006. The gain in SAH over this period is smaller than the gain in 
mortality as men aged 56.9 in 2006 reported similar SAH as men aged 55 in 1987 and 
women aged 57.7 in 2006 had about the same SAH as women aged 55 in 1987.    
 
Figure 26. Mortality and Self-Assessed Health 1987 and 2006, Men 
 
 
Figures 28 (men) and 29 (women) depict together trends in mortality, self-reported 
health status and self-reported work limitations as defined above. Figures 26 and 27 
show that the large gains in mortality rates have not been translated into better SAH. 
This is further reinforced by the data shown in Figures 28 and 29. On the one hand, the 
percentage of individuals who reported that their health status was less than good in the 
last year slightly decreased over the last twenty years, while the percentage who reported 











































Mortality 1987 Mortality 2006 Poor SAH 1987 Poor SAH 2006  34
having to cut their principal activities at least half a day because of a health-related 
problem increased during the same period.  
 
Figure 27. Mortality and Self-Assessed Health 1987 and 2006, Women 
 
 
Figure 28. Mortality rate of men,% in less than good health and with work 
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Figure 29. Mortality rate of women, % in less than good health and with work 
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3.4 Trends in disability and labor force participation 
 
In this section we provide some graphical evidence on labor force trends by age-groups 
and gender. Data on employment, unemployment and disability come from the Encuesta 
de Población Activa (EPA). The EPA is a rotating quarterly survey carried out by the 
Spanish National Statistical Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). The planned 
sample size consists of about 64,000 households with approximately 150,000 adult 
individuals. Although the survey has been conducted since 1964, publicly released cross-
sectional files are available only from 1977. The 1977 questionnaire was modified in 1987 
(when a set of retrospective questions were introduced), in the first quarter of 1992, in 
1999 and 2004. The EPA provides fairly detailed information on labor force status, 
education and family background variables but, like most of the other European-style 
labor force surveys, no information on health is provided. The reference period for most 
questions is the week before the interview.  
 
Figure 30 shows the evolution of employment rates by age-group for men and women 
separately. The data show that there has been an important increase in female labor force   36
participation since the mid-1980s, although employment rates of women in their forties 
are still far below the rates of their male counterparts (around twenty percentage points 
difference). The increase in female participation also translates in an increase in 
unemployment rates (Figure 31). The unemployment rates of males and females move in 
parallel since the beginning of the nineties. In addition, the data show that there are no 
differences across age groups among men, except for the lower unemployment rate of 
the older group resulting from lower labor force participation as suggested also by the 
employment rate.  
 


















Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 


















Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey   37
In the same spirit, Figures 32 (men) and 34 (women) show the evolution of the 
percentage of individuals who classify themselves as permanently disabled when asked 
about their labor status in the previous week using data from EPA. It should be noticed 
that there was a change in the survey in 1987 that affects the numbers shown. Before 
1987 there is information available about one state, while after 1987 individuals can be 
seen in up to three different states. This implies that some individuals could report being 
permanently disabled and doing some volunteer or paid work, for example. We have 
decided to count an individual as permanent disabled if he reports being so in any of the 
three possible states. This results in an increase in the percentage of disabled individuals 
after 1987, being the discontinuity higher among the older age groups. 
 

























Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
The data show that, for both male and female, the percentage of permanent disabled is 
higher among the older age groups, although the difference across age groups is bigger 
among males. Figure 33 shows the different enrollment rates into DI by men by age for 
the last year of data available. The data show that the percentage of men collecting 
disability benefits increases with age from less than 4% among men aged forty to over 
12% among men aged sixty-four.  
 
The share of women who can claim a contributory disability pension has increased 
through time with their labor participation. This could explain the lower differences 
across age-groups among women, as well as the increase of the share in women in   38
disability, while the share among men remains in general stable, except for the group 
aged over fifty-five. 
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Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 





















Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
Figures 32 and 34 also indicate the years in which the two main reforms took place (1997 
and 2002). We will investigate their effects a bit more into detail later. However, it is now 
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3.5 Disability, health and mortality  
 
We combine in Figures 35 to 37 the information on permanent disability shown in the 
previous section with the health and mortality information shown above for three age 
groups: i) forty to forty-four (Figure 35); ii) fifty to fifty-four (Figure 36); iii) sixty to 
sixty-four (Figure 37). The data show that the trend of the percentage of individuals into 
disability does not follow any of the other health measures. So, despite the reduction in 
age-specific mortality, the percentage of individuals into disability remains almost 
constant. As argued above, we would expect a reduction of disability coming from an 
improvement in mortality only if the onset of the disabling condition happens later in 
life. Otherwise, the share of the population at a given age in ill-health could even 
increase. Unfortunately, we cannot take any conclusive evidence on this regard with the 
analysis shown here. On the other hand, the stability of the share into disability during 
the last twenty years suggests that any changes that could have happened in the 
population’s health have not affected the inflows into disability. Thus, it is likely that 
other dimensions of the program are more important in explaining its evolution. We 
focus on the role of the different Social Security reforms in section 4.  
 
Figure 35. Disability, self-reported health, work limitation and mortality at age 40. 
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Note: the x-axis is common for the graph of men and women. The axis on the left is for the variables 
disability, bad self-assessed health and work limitation, while the axis on the right refers to the mortality 
rate.   40
 
Figure 36. Disability, self-reported health, work limitation and mortality at age 50. 
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Note: the x-axis is common for the graph of men and women. The axis on the left is for the variables 
disability, bad self-assessed health and work limitation, while the axis on the right refers to the mortality 
rate. 
 
Figure 37. Disability, self-reported health, work limitation and mortality at age 60. 
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Note: the x-axis is common for the graph of men and women. The axis on the left is for the variables 
disability, bad self-assessed health and work limitation, while the axis on the right refers to the mortality 
rate. 
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3.6 Health, mortality and labor force participation  
 
The data in Figure 30 above have shown that employment rates of men in their late 
fifties and early sixties in Spain decreased during the 80s until the mid 90s and, although 
they have slightly increased in the last decade, they are far from the rates observed in 
1980. In this section we combine data on health status and labor force participation. We 
will not show figures for women as the increase in female participation rates in the past 
masks any relationship.  
 
We first follow Shoven (2010) and look at a different definition of age based on mortality 
risks and compare the employment rates of individuals at the same mortality risk in 
different points in time. Then, if we assume that individuals with the same mortality risk 
experience the same health status, we can evaluate how participation rates change across 
time for individuals with the same health status. Figure 38
12 pictures the employment rate 
in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006 (last year for which both employment and mortality data 
are available) for each mortality risk for men.  
 































                                                 
12 We combine the information presented above on employment rates from the EPA with information on 
mortality rates from the Human Mortality Database for individuals aged forty to sixty-nine. The rates refer 
to five-age group averages for both measures.    42
The conclusions we draw from Figure 38 are somehow different from the ones drawn 
before. First of all, we find that participation rates have not increased among the older 
group of individuals, defined as individuals with higher mortality, in the later years. On 
the other hand, the employment rate decreases, not for all the individuals, but among the 
ones whose mortality risk is at least 0.5 percent. Consistently, the decrease through time 
is higher among the groups with higher mortality risks to the extent that the employment 
rates of groups whose mortality risk is at least 0.01 have been halved. Looking at the data 
in another way, the mortality rate when 60 percent of men were employed was 0.0175 
percent in 1980, but it was only 0.01 percent 26 years later. Therefore, men in 2006 had 
to be much healthier (by the mortality measure) in 2006 that they were in 1980 for the 
employment rate to be 60 percent.  
 
As argued above, individuals with the same mortality-risk do not necessarily face the 
same health status as health care technology improvements could have helped to 
decrease the age-specific mortality risks, but at the cost of higher prevalence of disability. 
In order to shed some light on this, we focus on the evolution of employment rates using 
both information on self-assessed health and the existence of a work limitation using 
ENS data.  
 
Figure 39 shows the employment rates by individual’s self-assessed health. We have 
grouped self-assessed health in two categories: good or very good health (thin lines in the 
Figure) and fair, bad or very bad health (thick lines in the Figure). We have used this 
division as it was found to capture better the age differences in health status (see Figure 
11 above). The data show that employment rates of individuals in bad health are much 
lower compared to their healthy peers among individuals younger than sixty. More 
specifically, among men aged fifty to fifty-four who report being in bad health only about 
sixty percent is at work, while this number is higher than eighty percent among the 
healthy ones. The employment rates of healthy and unhealthy individuals converge 
among the group aged at least sixty.  
 
The second feature shown by Figure 39 is that employment rates of individuals older 
than fifty-five in good health had fallen from 1987 to 1997 and, although some recovery 
is observed in 2006, employment rates are still below the ones observed in 1987. This is 
in line with the data shown in Figure 30. The evidence regarding individuals in bad health   43
is less clear-cut and it seems that employment rates of this group have remained stable 
through time.    
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All together, the evidence presented here suggests that health status is an important 
variable in determining labor force participation among individuals younger than sixty, 
but it becomes less important as the social security incentives of the old-age pension 
system kick in. We then now focus on the role played by the different social security 
reforms in explaining the evolution of labor force participation trends in general, and 
more specifically, the participation in the disability program. 
  
 
4. Pathways to retirement and program reforms 
 
In the previous section we have shown that the trends in labor force participation are not 
likely to be driven by the evolution of the population health. Thus, in this section we 
analyze the relationship with the other usual suspect, i.e., the incentives that the Social 
Security system poses to individuals to withdraw from the labor market.  
   44
In particular, we first look at the association between the characteristics of the social 
security system and the inflow into and the stock of the main contributory social security 
programs (permanent disability, retirement and unemployment). Later, we provide a 
tentative evaluation of the two main reforms of the social security system that have 
affected the incentives of old-age workers to withdraw from the labor force during the 
period for which we have data available.    
 
4.1. Descriptive evidence on the pathways to retirement 
 
The evidence pictured in Figures 30 to 34 above using aggregate data from the Spanish 
Labor Force Survey, which uses self-reported labor status, did not show any change in 
behavior after the 1997 reform, neither after the 2002 reform. Let us recall that the main 
characteristics of the reform held in 1997 were the implementation of stricter medical 
control to apply for disability benefits, and the decrease in generosity of the contributory 
old-age benefits. The 2002 reform provided individuals with more incentives to continue 
working beyond the age of sixty-five, at the same time that a more stringent search 
criteria was required among the unemployed.  
 








































Inflow in contributory permanent disability benefits
 
Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Ministry of Employment and Immigration 
and population figures from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy. 
 
Figure 40 shows administrative data on the inflows into contributory permanent 
disability benefits. This data is obtained from the Spanish National Social Security   45
Institute (www.seg-social.es). The data show that the percentage of individuals going into 
this system slightly decreased after 1997 for all the age groups considered (from forty to 
sixty-four) and it stayed constant thereafter. Figure 41 shows comparable data for the 
inflows into contributory old-age benefits. The trends and levels remain stable through 
the period despite the different reforms.  
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Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Ministry of Employment and Immigration 
and population figures from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy.  
 
 
In order to look at changes in the postponement of the retirement age, Figure 42 shows 
the percentage of the population that enters into contributory old-age benefits by age for 
individuals aged sixty to sixty-four. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the 
total number of inflows into old-age contributory pensions by individual ages for 
individuals aged sixty-five or older so we present two different shares. The first one 
considers inflow as a share of the total population aged at least sixty-five (as in Figure 
41), while the second one uses the population aged sixty-five to sixty-nine, as retirement 
later than sixty-nine is anecdotic. 
 
In order for the policy reforms to have effects on the sustainability of the system, they 
should influence the stock of individuals in the different programs. Figure 43 shows the 
total number of pensioners in the two previous programs from 1980 to 2009. 
Unfortunately, this information is not available by age groups. The general picture shows 
a slightly increasing trend in the number of pensioners in both programs. The total 
number of disability pensioners decreased in 1997 when all the disability pensions of   46
individuals aged sixty-five and older were reclassified as old-age pensions, so the amount 
of old-age pensioners increased correspondingly. The growing time trend could be at 
least partly explained by the incorporation of women into the labor market or the 
population ageing.  
 
Figure 42. Inflow into old-age benefits for individuals aged sixty to sixty-four by 
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Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Ministry of Employment and Immigration 
and population figures from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy.  
 
 


































































































































Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Ministry of Employment and Immigration  
 
 
From 2002 onwards, at least in theory, in order to claim unemployment benefits older 
workers also had to enroll in active searching at the same time that unemployed   47
individuals aged at least fifty-two could combine unemployment benefits with earnings. 
A priori, one would expect this reform to have some effects on the number of older 
individuals claiming unemployment benefits. However, the percentage of the population 
older than fifty-five that was receiving unemployment benefits did not change thereafter. 
This is shown in Figure 41, which uses administrative data from the Ministry of 
Employment and Immigration. In fact, the share of the population older than sixty-five 
receiving unemployment benefits continued to grow despite the economic growth.  
 
Figure 44. Percentage of the population aged at least fifty-five receiving 
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Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Ministry of Employment and Immigration 
and population figures from the Ministry of Health and Social Policy.  
 
 
In figure 45 we make use of another source of administrative data, the “Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL)”, to contrast the results obtained above. The 
MCVL is a microeconomic data set based on administrative records provided by the 
Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random sample of 4% of all the 
individuals who, at some point during 2007, had contributed towards the social security 
system either by working, being in an unemployment scheme or receiving a contributory 
pension. The random sample selected contains over one million individuals. The MCVL 
provides rich employment history information at the cost of scarce representativeness as   48
we go back in time. This is particularly important here as the individuals of any cohort 
entering into disability benefits are expected to have higher mortality rates and therefore, 
to have lower probability of being selected in 2007. In this respect, the information 
provided here is complementary to the other sources 
 
Figure 45 plots the number of individuals entering permanent disability benefits each 
year from 1970 until 2007. The two red lines correspond to the years of the 1997 and 
2002 reforms. As for the reform in 1997, a possible anticipation effect is observed as 
inflows into permanent disability pensions increased in 1997. This could be either due to 
the expected future higher requirements or to the decrease in the generosity of the old-
age pension system. However, the inflows in the disability system dropped in the 
subsequent years. 
 
Figure 42 Number of individuals entering permanent disability benefits each 



























1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year of Inflow into Disability Benefits
 
Source: Own calculations using administrative data from the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales.  
 
 
On the other hand, the 2002 reform, which tightened the job search criteria for 
unemployed individuals, had a clear substitution effect of increasing the inflows into 
disability benefits. Recall that disability benefits are of a permanent nature and do not   49
have any job search criteria attached to their eligibility requirements and are thus, much 
more attractive for older workers with already some previous health related problems. 
 
Figure 46 Percentage of individuals in each social security program (self-
































































































Unemployed Old Age  Disability
 
Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
 
Figure 47. Percentage of individuals in each social security program (self-


































































































Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
 
Figures 46 to 48 report, for the three older five-years age groups of working-age 
individuals, the percentage that reports being in each program in the EPA. The data is 
also only shown for men and cannot be fully compared to the one shown in Figures 40   50
to 44; not only because it is self-reported, but also because individuals receiving a non-
contributory pension should also report receiving a pension or benefit (either disability, 
old-age or unemployment) in the EPA, while they were not included in the previous 
figures. 
 
Figure 48. Percentage of individuals in each social security program (self-
































































































Unemployed Old Age Disability
 
Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
The data from Figures 46 to 48 reinforces the previous evidence; the percentage of the 
population either unemployed, receiving disability or old-age benefits increases with age. 
On the other hand, the share of individuals that declare being disabled or retired is higher 
the older the group, while at the same time, the share of unemployed individuals 
becomes smaller. In fact, the share of individuals aged sixty-to-sixty-four that report 
being unemployed is below five percent compared to the rate of ten percent (except for 
the last years) of the other two groups. At the same time, the data does not show any 
substitution effects across programs after the different reforms or drops in the 
participation rates. 
 
In order to better approach a measure of the pathways into retirement, we look at the 
exit routes from employment. We use the retrospective information available in the 
second quarter of the EPA regarding the labour status of individuals in the previous year. 
We calculate the percentage that transit from employment to each of the status of 
interest. This is shown in Figures 49 to 51. Unfortunately, the retrospective information 
does not distinguish between the different jobless status, which would have allowed us to 
identify the individuals that transit from unemployment or disability into retirement.   51
 
Figure 49. Outflows from Employment into unemployment, disability and old-
















































































Unemployment Old Age Disability
 
Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
 Figure 50. Outflows from Employment into unemployment, disability and old-















































































Unemployment Old Age Disability
 
Note: own elaboration using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
 
The conclusions reached from these figures are similar to the ones presented above.  
The share of individuals that leave employment and transit into unemployment is higher 
among the relatively younger individuals than among the older groups (80% of men aged 
fifty-to-fifty-four that leave employment, and transit to one of the status of interest go to 
unemployment compared to 20% among men aged sixty-to-sixty-four). The main 
difference with previous Figures is the smaller percentage of individuals that leave 
employment to transit into disability among men older than sixty. This is consistent with   52
the numbers shown in Figure 40 for contributory permanent benefits, and suggests that 
the biggest share of individuals into disability in this age-group is mostly due to an 
accumulation of individuals who left employment and transit into disability earlier in 
their career and/or individuals receiving non-contributory disability benefits transiting 
from another jobless state.  
 
Figure 51. Outflows from Employment into unemployment, disability and old-



















































































4.2. A tentative analysis of the quantitative effects of the reforms   
 
The descriptive evidence shown in the previous sections of this chapter points out that 
the reforms had, if any, small effects on the labor market behavior of older workers. In 
this section we attempt to provide some estimates of both the effects of the different 
reforms in participation in different programs, as well as analyze the substitution effects 
among programs.  
 
We first show in figure 52 the share of each age group that goes into permanent 
contributory disability before and after the set of reforms that took place in 1997 in both 
the disability and old-age pension systems using the administrative data from the Ministry 
of Employment and Immigration shown in Figure 40. The data shows that the share of 
individuals transiting into disability decreases among all the age-groups studied, except 
among individuals aged fifty to fifty-four. The drop is small in absolute terms among all   53
groups, but this is due to the small shares into disability. However, it represents a nine 
percent drop for the group with the largest inflow into disability (individuals aged fifty-
five to fifty-nine).  
 
Figure 49. Inflow into permanent disability before and after the 1997 reform. Data 
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These estimates represent a before-after analysis in a period of economic growth. As can 
be derived from the evidence shown above, the labour force participation has been 
increasing since the mid nineties for older workers. Therefore, we need to control at least 
for changes in total employment outflows before drawing any conclusion.  
 
We provide estimates of how the percentage in each program (disability, unemployment 
and old-age) changes after each of the two reforms of interest when one controls for a 
time trend and the total share out of employment. We use data from EPA aggregated at 
the gender and age-group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) level using two levels of regional 
aggregation. We first use the same figures shown previously in this chapter, and we later 
construct aggregates at the regional level (Autonomous Communities). Although there is 
no variation in the timing of the reforms across regions, it provides us with variation in 
the shares out of employment and in per capita GDP.   54
 
Thus, we estimate the following model: 
 
srgat srgat s s
a




r sr s srgat O D D D D D S                      2002 2002 1997 1997 0     
Where Ssrgat is the share of individuals of gender g and age-group a in region r in year t 
that are in the status s (s being disability, unemployment and retirement), and Osrgat is the 
corresponding share out of employment. The other set of explanatory variables are 
region-dummies (Dr), gender-dummies (Dg), age-dummies (Da), a time trend ( st  ) and 
two dummies capturing the effect of the reforms: D1997  takes value one from 1997 
onwards and zero otherwise, and D2002 takes value one from 2002 onwards and zero 
otherwise.  
 
In order to control for the endogeneity of the total outflow, we use regional GDP per 
capita as an instrument. When we provide estimates at the country-level, we use national 
values. We obtain GDP information from the Spanish Institute of Statistics 
(www.ine.es). 
 
We repeat the same analysis but, instead of using information about the stock of 
individuals in the different programmes, we use information on the outflows from 
employment as shown in Figures 46 to 48 above. This analysis is only shown using the 
aggregates at the country-level because the data cells at the regional level were too small 
as only the information on individuals that were working on the previous year is used to 
obtain the different aggregate figures.  
 
The results for the parameters of interest are shown in Table 4. Tables A1 to A3 in the 
appendix show both the first-stage estimates and the coefficients of the other variables. 
First, notice from Tables A1 to A3 that the total outflow and the share out of 
employment diminished after both the 1997 and the 2002 reform.  
 
The sign of the effects of the two reforms on the participation in each program is the 
same using the data at the country-level (first three rows of Table 4) or exploiting the 
regional variation (second three rows of Table 4) except for the effect of the 1997 reform 
on the disability system. However, none of the effects at the country-level are significant   55
probably due to the small sample size (120 observations). On the other hand, the analysis 
at the regional level shows an interesting pattern: both the 1997 and the 2002 reform 
decreased the stock into old-age benefits at the cost of an increased share of the 
participation into disability. More interestingly, the magnitude of the two opposite effects 
is the same suggesting a clear substitution effect among these two programs in the older 
age-groups. 
 
Table 4. Selected results of the estimate of the 1997 and 2002 reform on the stock 
of the different social security programmes, and the outflows from employment. 
Results based on national and regional aggregates.  



























































(0.0011)  108 0.846 
 
 
 The results also show that none of these two reforms had any effect on the share of 
these age-groups into unemployment, which is highly explained by the total share of the 
population out of employment. Regarding the effects of these two reforms on the 
outflows from employment into the different programs shown in the last three rows of 
Table 4, we find that there was a significant increase in the outflow from employment 
into disability after the 2002 reform. The rest of coefficients are non-significant, although 
we cannot rule out that this is due to the lack of explanatory power due to the small 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have shown that despite the large improvements in mortality rates 
among older individuals in Spain, the employment rates of individuals older than fifty-
five remain lower than the ones observed in the late 1970s, and the decrease in 
participation is more drastic when comparing different cohorts with the same mortality-
based age than with the same age-since-birth.  
 
Alternatively, decreases in mortality rates do not necessarily go hand in hand with 
improvements in population health. The descriptive evidence on health trends provided 
here remains inconclusive. On one hand, there is some evidence suggesting a health 
deterioration, as the percentage that reports having reduced their principal activity 
because of a health problem, as well as the prevalence of hypertension, cholesterol and 
obesity, and the number of hospitalizations due to mental disorders have increased. On 
the other hand, the percentage that reports being in good or very good health has also 
increased, while the number of hospitalizations due to other illnesses except for mental 
problems has decreased.  
 
Health status is an important variable in determining labor force participation among 
individuals younger than sixty, but it becomes less important as the social security 
incentives of the old-age pension system kick in. The comparison of trends in mortality, 
health and employment and participation in different social security programs shows a 
lack of an overall association among these dimensions in the last twenty years in Spain. 
Thus we try to disentangle the effect of the main social security reforms since 1990. In 
1997 the medical requirements of the disability system were tightened and the generosity 
of the old-age pension system was decreased, while in 2002 the job search criteria to 
receive unemployment benefits was tightened and more incentives to retire later were 
introduced. Using regional aggregate data, we find that both the 1997 and the 2002 
reform decreased the stock into old-age benefits at the cost of an increased share of the 
participation into disability. More interestingly, the magnitude of the two opposite effects 
is the same suggesting a clear substitution effect among these two programs in the older 
age-groups.  
   57
An avenue for further research is the evaluation of the aforementioned reforms using 
longitudinal individual data in order to follow the different transitions. Moreover, it 
would be of interest to use the time variation in the implementation of the different old-
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Outflows from employment into the different programs. Data aggregated at 










  Coef. SE. Coef. SE. Coef. SE. Coef. SE. 
out  of  employment      0.030 0.017 0.093 0.040 0.118 0.033 
women  -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.012 0.002 -0.018 0.005 
50-54  0.012 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004 
55-59  0.072 0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.016 0.006 0.014 0.007 
d1997  -0.015 0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
d2002  -0.015 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 
GDP  1.5x10-7 4.2x10-8        
constant -0.028  0.023  0.001  0.001 0.017 0.003 0.006 0.006 
N 108 
   
   
   
Table A2. Stock in the different programs. Data aggregated at the national level 
 Non-working  Disability  Unemployed  Retired 
  Coef. SE.  Coef. SE.  Coef. SE.  Coef. SE. 
non-working     -0.191  0.028 0.370 0.142 0.169 0.192 
women  0.391 0.010 0.035 0.011 -0.176 0.069 -0.215 0.108 
50-54  0.108 0.012 0.039 0.014 -0.048 0.024 0.028 0.048 
55-59  0.281 0.012 0.089 0.018 -0.143 0.045 0.165 0.048 
d1997  -0.010 0.021 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
d2002  -0.003 0.026 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.004 
trend  0.012 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
GDP  -6.5x10-7 2.5x10-7        
constant  0.570 0.117 0.098 0.017 -0.022 0.029 0.049 0.058 
N 120 
   
 
   
Table A3. Stock in the different programs. Data aggregated at the level of the Autonomous 
Communities 
 Non-working  Disability  Unemployed  Retired 
  Coef. SE. Coef. SE. Coef. SE. Coef. SE. 
non-working     0.276  0.124  0.264 0.141 0.006 0.148 
women  0.403 0.004 -0.149 0.051 -0.135 0.058 -0.168 0.063 
50-54  0.107 0.004 -0.014 0.014 -0.036 0.015 0.049 0.020 
55-59  0.278 0.004 -0.047 0.035 -0.109 0.039 0.215 0.041 
d1997  -0.026 0.007 0.008 0.004 -0.005 0.005 -0.011 0.005 
d2002  -0.035 0.006 0.021 0.006 -0.007 0.006 -0.019 0.007 
trend  0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
GDP  -1.1x10-5 2.1x10-6        
constant  0.363 0.010 -0.021 0.043 0.013 0.050 0.099 0.057 
N 1836 
   
   
 